For example, once it became clear during the course of the 'Great Cause' that no firmly established custom could be identified for the Scottish succession, legal opinion was sought from the University Faculties of Paris. The advice of this international community -with Scottish clerics among both their professoriate and student body -was that in the absence of a recorded native custom for Scotland, then Roman Imperial law should be reverted to and that this favoured nearness by degree, i.e. the claim of Bruce. 4 Such a default position might have been acceptable to the court constructed to hear the Scottish dispute: the 104 auditors nominated by King Edward (24) , Balliol and Bruce (40 each) were themselves based upon the iudicium centumvirale of Roman law, and Scottish common or customary law already contained strong aspects of that legal tradition. 5 Furthermore, if Bruce had employed Scottish clerical lawyers educated in such practice, his camp might have made profound use of two recent written agreements of Alexander III and the Scottish political community. In 1281 the Scots' treaty of marriage for the king's daughter with Norway's Eric II, and then in 1284 a parliamentary act of entail holding all prelates and nobles of Scotland to recognise Alexander's grand-daughter, Margaret Maid of Norway, as heir presumptive to the throne, both included subsidiary clauses which not only recognised the right of female royals to succeed to the Scottish throne but also made provision -in the event of the birth of further children (boys or girls) -for succession by the nearest by degree, rather than seniority: for example, the said entail (or tailzie) of 1284 would allow any child -son or daughter (thus one degree removed) -which Alexander III might yet produce by a second queen, to succeed before his grand-daughter, the Maid (two degrees removed, through Alexander's first queen). 6 
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In a sense, it might be added, the Scottish community had already acted in this fashion in 1195. In that year, King William I had tried to persuade his subjects to recognise his daughter, Margaret, and her husband, Otto of Brunswick, as his heirs. But a Scottish assembly had insisted on the right of William's brother, Earl David, and his son (John, later earl of Huntingdon and Chester (d. 1237)), to succeed before Margaret (whose rights after David's line were not denied, only her 'foreign' spouse rejected). 7 William would go on to have a son late in life, Alexander (born 1198), but the incident of 1195 might have been an extremely advantageous precedent for Bruce of Annandale to place before Edward I in 1291-2. Moreover, the latter's grand-father, John I, had succeeded his elder brother, Richard I, in 1199 as his nearest adult heir by degree and as a younger son of Henry II (1152-89), thus denying the rights of his and Richard's nephew, Arthur, the son of their middle brother and therefore only a grandson of Henry II (although as J.C. Holt has shown, the legality of this succession was challenged in various quarters of the Angevin Empire and John remained sensitive to criticisms of his legitimacy). 8 That Bruce and his advisors do not seem to have been aware of the Parisian University advice or these possible late twelfth-century precedents is underlined by Robert of Annandale's commitment on another tack of claimed custom, namely designation of the heir-in-waiting, which might also be achieved through a witnessed act by an incumbent king and his subjects (or 'statutory succession' as the late Historiographer Royal of Scotland described it). 9 The best-known incidence of designation of a royal heir in Scotland As in France, though, the dynastic threat was forcefully reduced by the early thirteenth-century and the ruling line was underpinned by an aura of legitimacy enhanced through association with royal and saintly ancestors and through carefully developed ritual and royal space. 13 The death of the Maid in late September-October of 1290, of course, ended all such manoeuvrings and returned the succession competition to the arena of law.
Historians have largely concurred that all interested parties accepted that, no matter how underhand or forceful Edward I had been in first securing recognition of English overlordship of Scotland from the various claimants, the final decision reached in November 1292 was the correct one in law. 24 The leading affinity of nobles and prelates from the Scottish political community -headed by the Comyn family -were content to win a decision which favoured their Balliol candidate (and close relation by marriage): Bruce of Annandale, besides, managed to make his claim look increasingly desperate by offering the aforementioned partition deals at the eleventh hour.
However, not only do we now have a far stronger picture of the Balliols as dedicated English Crown servants throughout the thirteenth-century, but, as A.A.M.
Duncan has shown, the actual selection of John Balliol was surely a far more political and pragmatic act of will on Edward I's part. The English king had the backing of the Scottish and English auditors hearing the Cause only as to his general ability to make a decision based on the evidence heard, but not as to what exact customs or laws of succession should be applied to shape that decision: these guiding customs simply remained unidentified. Edward besides chose to ignore the Paris legal advice which favoured Bruce (by degree) and elected instead to treat the Scottish kingdom as an
English fief yet -and this was an unprecedented application of law sought by Balliolnonetheless not a divisible inheritance. 25 This allowed Edward to choose Balliol, a man readily bent to Plantagenet designs, and to turn to more important matters (Wales, France, the Holy Land) after a year of physical control of Scotland.
At this juncture it is, though, worth dwelling on additional evidence which may further explain why the Scots (except Bruce) were acceptant of Balliol's elevation -by seniority -as a vassal king. For it may be the case that all parties involved already knew as his heir presumptive just before he too left on a campaign: Edward Bruce was similarly recognised as being king-worthy at a time of risk for the ruling dynasty and a king who was still, nonetheless, expected to father sons.
Yet an awareness of the vulnerability of the royal house also perhaps speaks to pressure placed on a then son-less Robert I by his subjects to designate an heir presumptive which provided the greatest stability at a time of war, an adult male rather than a female (which risked a return to the crisis of 1286-90 Alexander Bruce would certainly go on to take up the Bruce patrimony of the earldom of Carrick, a possible sign that he was legitimised at a later date. 35 If this had come to pass, Robert I, still without a son, might have had cause to recast the royal entail to name Alexander, just as the birth of Robert Stewart -and his survival through infancy -would prompt such a restatement before the community.
However, Edward Bruce's death actually meant that the succession had to be restated not out of confidence at the increasing security of the dynasty but as a safeguard against impending crisis, for the only identified heir to the Bruce throne was now a minor. It is striking that the fresh entail issued by Parliament in December 1318 (called immediately after Edward's death) is prefaced with what amounts to an oath by all subjects to obey the Crown's 'ordinance' in this matter or face charges of lèse-majesté.
Moreover, the act now actually defined the Roman legal principle to be applied to the succession (nearness by degree, as identified by A.A.M. Duncan) in the absence of an established custom of the realm:
Furthermore since sometimes in the past some people (though not many) have expressed doubt regarding the rules by which the succession to the kingdom of Scotland should be decided and defined if perhaps it was uncertain, it was declared and defined in the same parliament by the clergy and people that the said succession ought never in the past nor in the future be defined with reference to the custom observed in the kingdom regarding inferior fiefs and inheritances, for no custom of any sort had as yet been introduced regarding the succession to the kingdom; but that when a king dies, the nearest male in the direct line of descent, or if a male was not available the nearest female in the same line, or if that line is entirely lacking then the nearest male in the collateral line, ought to succeed the king in the kingdom, with concern for the right line by blood by which the right to rule applied to the dead king, the succession to whom will hopefully be achieved without challenge or any kind of obstacle, because it will be thought to be sufficiently in accordance with imperial law. the aforesaid five brothers and their heirs male descending from them happening finally and wholly to fail (which God forbid), the true and lawful heirs of the royal blood and kin shall thenceforward succeed to the kingdom and the right of reigning.
Clearly, at this juncture there was no perceived need -nor, more importantly a political will -to apply the Imperial law of nearness by degree to all the lines descended through 53 In the end, the French only began to exploit this Law just as the Scottish Crown (though not the Scottish nobility) was seemingly neutralised as an ally with the English capture of Prince James [James I] swiftly followed by the death of Robert III in 1406. 54 The Scots, however, seem to have reacted to these English and French succession developments by doing nothing. In 1406, there was no viable alternative to the Stewarts as kings and if James I was deprived to the realm then Robert II's extended family could provide ample male heirs under the terms of the 1373 entail. Indeed, that act was to be the last occasion on which a Scottish parliament was called to debate or legislate on the Scottish succession. Even when, by the 1440s, the Stewart male kindred had been gravely reduced by political crises and James I had had six daughters all married off to foreign allies, no remedial entail acts naming heirs were drafted. On that occasion, any potential crisis was averted by the then minor king, James II, growing to manhood and siring three sons. This seems to have been the solution to which Scottish kings and government seemed content to trust their future stability from the early fifteenth-century, even when the direct succession might lie with a single infant legitimate heir -as in 1512 (a 1 year old boy) and 1542 (a week old girl) -no collateral heirs presumptive were named by 28 statute. Nor were the Scots swayed by mounting French commitment to excluding females, or even by Lancastrian propaganda -issued from exile in Scotland in 1461 -which also shunned distaff inheritance. 55 
